Of course, it would be too much for a single nominalist to provide an acceptable version of each respectable scientific theory. |
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Thus, in the nominalist doctrine, names are make-believes bearing no relation to the real. |
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If 'make-believisation' is not nominalist, it does however indicate the limits of the realism of structure. |
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Thus, the real challenge for the nominalist is to explain simple predicative facts, e.g., the fact that the ball is red, without appealing to properties, e.g., redness. |
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To be acquitted of this prima facie commitment, the nominalist seeks a paraphrase that avoids it not just for this one sentence, but for ordinary discourse about holes generally. |
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The value bestowed upon the make-believe does not cover over the nominalist viewpoint, and the proof of this is that Lacan strives to demonstrate that the make-believe is the opposite of the artefact: 'Discourse is artefact. |
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Prior thinkers, including the early 14th century nominalist philosopher William of Ockham, had begun the intellectual movement toward empiricism. |
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