| I find mentalism, hypnotism and the study of body language very intriguing. |
|
| Magic in Theory would have benefited from further discussion of mentalism and psychic entertainment. |
|
| For 15 years, from 1995 to 2010, Fabrice Delauré has kept on developping the new instruments of contemporary mentalism. |
|
| Being creative, he guesses he has invented more than 40 magic tricks and mentalism. |
|
| They will transport you to the unexplored recesses of science, mixing mentalism and visual oddities. |
|
| Indeed, for 15 years this valuable knowledge has been guaranteeing us the supremacy of the technological mentalism market worldwide. |
|
| He often takes up the classics of mentalism, extending their physical limits to the maximum. |
|
| She was beginning to get a headache and figured it would probably be easiest to rely on her physical ability than her recently-discovered mentalism. |
|
| However, as behaviorists are amply aware, the use of subjective reporting suffers from a tendency towards unreliability, and at worse an embrace of mentalism. |
|
| Not all justifiers, therefore, are mental states, and so mentalism would have to be either abandoned or modified. |
|
| If it is true in fact that everything that is accessible by reflection is a mental state, then mentalism will follow directly from this fact coupled with complete justifier internalism. |
|
| The Clipboard 3: It is the most beautiful mentalism trick that I know of. |
|
| There would be a tight connection between mentalism and accessibility internalism if all of the mental states that are justifiers for beliefs were occurrent mental states. |
|
| The denial of mentalism would simply be the view that holds that something other than mental states of a cognizer can qualify as genuine justifiers. |
|
| If all of these justifiers are mental states, as mentalism contends, most of them would be buried deep in one's mental storehouse, beyond the reach of reflective awareness. |
|
| So, mentalism but not PI is perfectly compatible with a view that says that sensory states that are themselves not beliefs and not things that can be appropriately said to be justified can nonetheless function as justifiers. |
|
